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International Surrogacy Contract
Regulation: National Governments' and
International Bodies' Misguided Quests to
Prevent Exploitation
By EMILY STEHR*
The greatest accomplishment of humans has not been our science,
but our development of human rights and democracy. Science
deals with facts, not values. Since science cannot tell us what we
should do, or even what our goals are, humans must give direction
to science.'
I. Introduction
A surrogacy arrangement is generally not considered a "new"
reproductive technology like cloning or pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, because unlike those technologies, surrogacy has not
traditionally altered human reproduction by allowing parents to
screen embryos' traits. Within the past few decades, however, the
practice of using a surrogate to conceive has changed dramatically
with regard to the medico-technical developments in the field and the
commercialization of the relationship between the commissioning
parent(s) and birth mother.
Before the development of in vitro fertilization (IVF), in fact as
* Emily Stehr is currently a 3L at UC Hastings. She would like to express her
greatest appreciation to Professor Obasogie and Dr. Darnovsky for their invaluable
guidance in this project. In addition to her HICLR Note editing team, she would also
like to thank Hannah Kaye for her always thoughtful and encouraging comments.
1. GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HEALTH LAW BOUNDARIES 141 (2005).
2. See Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy
Between United States and India, 39 CUM. L. REv. 15, 16 (2008-2009).
253
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
far back as biblical times,' the norm was a "traditional" surrogacy
agreement in which a fertile man and an infertile woman who wanted
to have a child arranged for a surrogate to become pregnant by the
man. After the advent of IVF, many early surrogacy arrangements
involved a woman who both supplied the egg(s) and carried the
pregnancy after being artificially inseminated with sperm from the
fertile male.4  After birth, the surrogate gave the child to the
commissioning couple.5 In this arrangement, the child was genetically
related to the commissioning man and the surrogate mother.
Recently there has been an increasing trend towards the use of
gestational surrogacy, sometimes now called "commercial surrogacy,"
in which a fertile man's sperm and a fertile woman's eggs are
combined outside the woman's body using IVF and then a surrogate
gestates the resulting fertilized egg(s).6 Under this arrangement, the
child is genetically related to the commissioning man and woman, or
to the commissioning man and a third woman who provides eggs, but
not to the surrogate birth mother.
Responses to this development have been varied. Some
feminists view these contractual arrangements as nothing more than
"reproductive purchase orders where women are procured as
instruments in a system of breeding" thereby creating a "traffic in
women exploited for their reproductive faculties and functions."
More libertarian feminists, however, side with radical free marketers
in their view that "freedom for women include[s] the freedom to
contract for labor, be it working in a factory or bearing a child."8
Whichever view one takes, what is clear is that the new technologies
and market forces implicated in commercial surrogacy are
illuminating significant issues of human dignity and human rights, but
thus far there are no substantive, uniform global regulations to
3. See, e.g., Genesis 16 (documenting the maid Hagar's surrogacy on behalf of
Abraham's infertile wife Sarah after Sarah persuaded her husband to sleep with her
maid); Genesis 30 (documenting Bilhah's surrogacy on behalf of Rachel, the barren
wife of Jacob).
4. See 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 2010).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 83 (2005).
8. Id. at 77.
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protect the parties involved.
Furthermore, debate about these topics and control over the
existing fragmentary regulations have been limited to an elite
minority because of a growing trend to value expert opinion in
matters of reproductive science and biotechnology."o This problem
was not fully remedied by the recent Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR), in which the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
promoted widespread political engagement in the process of creating
uniform, global biotechnology regulations. The UDBHR's
promotion of respect for cultural diversity and pluralism in assessing
complex issues of social justice tends to undermine the global
regulatory uniformity it seeks to achieve, which is why a new
approach is needed."
International bodies and the nations they represent will have a
better chance of creating global regulations that successfully promote
social justice if (1) their political processes are informed by systematic
studies of the health, economic, and social justice impacts of the
international surrogacy market, and (2) advocacy groups that
champion crucial, but currently underrepresented, points of view are
given an equal voice in the debates. This Note argues that
9. See generally Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of
Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 275 (2009);
Sherylynn Fiandaca, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryos: The Need for International
Guidelines, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 337 (Dec. 2008).
10. See Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical
Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 26 (2010)
("For a variety of reasons, the fertility industry in general and the practice of
oocyte donation specifically is not heavily regulated in the United States,
particularly compared to other developed countries. The result is that the
fertility industry in the United States relies heavily on self-regulation, which
generally takes the form of guidelines issued by two professional
organizations - the American Society for Reproductive Medicine and the
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology.");
see also Lee, supra note 9, at 281 (noting that in India and the United States, private
industry is left to regulate itself due to the lack of national regulatory agencies to
enforce surrogacy laws); Marcy Darnovsky, "Moral Questions of an Altogether
Different Kind:" Progressive Politics in the Biotech Age, 4 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 99,
107 (2010) (describing the professional field of bioethics and commenting that
"[t]hough bioethicists typically present themselves as experts rather than as
spokespeople, their work and their words can too easily function as a substitute for
democratic participation in biotechnology-related policy matters.").
11. See Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNESCO, art. 12
(Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=31058
&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html.
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international surrogacy arrangements should be subject to universal
regulations, and that these regulations should be the product of
inclusive and informed political debate. Commercial surrogacy
technologies should be regulated because they, like other
biotechnologies, implicate profound moral and ethical concerns;
cloning, for example, is prohibited because it is "profoundly wrong,"
"dangerous," and "adverse to fundamental rights and freedoms."l 2
Because there is not a similar consensus about the absolute negativity
of surrogacy contracts' effects, a total international ban like the one
on reproductive cloning would not be suitable to the surrogacy
context. This is why the UDBHR attempted to create a middle path
promoting regulatory control that respected disparate cultural views
of the practice. But because international surrogacy contracts
transcend geographic and cultural boundaries, regulations would
more effectively promote social justice and protect vulnerable
populations if they were based on systematic studies of community
health and social impact as well as inclusive political engagement.
II. Background on the Ethical, Medical, and Social Justice
Issues Implicated in Surrogacy Arrangements
As the case of Johnson v. Calvert illustrates, commercial
surrogacy contracts have the potential to be ethically troubling,
medically dangerous, and adverse to women's fundamental rights and
freedoms." The case also exemplifies how changes in the market for
surrogates have resulted in complex new legal, political, and moral
conundrums that have not yet been comprehensively addressed. 4 in
the Johnson-Calvert contract, Johnson agreed to serve as the
12. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine:
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, ETS No. 164, pmbl.,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/ 164.htm
("Unlike the United States, Europe has explicitly prohibited the human
biotechnology practices that generate the most concern, including
reproductive human cloning, inheritable genetic modification, and sex
selection for nonmedical purposes. These prohibitions are justified by an
appeal to 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' in the Council of
Europe's 1998 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.").
See also President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Signing of Stem Cell Executive
Order and Scientific Integrity Presidential Memorandum (Mar. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-prepared-delivery-
signing-stem-cell-executive-order-and-scientifi (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
13. 5 Cal. 4th 84, 84 (1993).
14. Id.
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gestational surrogate for the Calverts in exchange for a $10,000 lump
sum payment and the provision of a $200,000 life insurance policy."
As time progressed, the parties' relationship deteriorated until they
ultimately sued each other, each requesting a judicial determination
of parentage and entitlement to parental rights." The California
Supreme Court was forced to confront the central conundrum that
while California law recognized only one natural mother, two natural
mothers were now a possibility as a result of new technology." The
court held that "although the [California Uniform Parentage] Act
recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of
establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do
not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-
that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California
law."" In the court's multiple references to its discomfort with having
to make this determination without sufficient input from the people's
representatives, it clearly expressed a preference for democratic
discourse as the means of resolving such a central element of the
human experience as the identity of a baby's mother.19
The court was uneasy about having to rule on other difficult
moral and political questions such as whether the contract in question
subjected surrogates to involuntary servitude or dehumanized poor
women.2o Noting that "[w]e are all too aware that the proper forum
for resolution of this issue is the Legislature, where empirical data,
largely lacking from this record, can be studied and rules of general
applicability developed," the court nevertheless answered some of
15. Id. at 87.
16. Id. at 88.
17. Id. at 93.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 97 (where the court notes that the "proper forum for resolution of this
issue is the Legislature"); id. at 101 (where the court says "[i]t is not the role of the
judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the Legislature has not
seen fit to do so"); id. at 102 (Arabian, J., concurring) (Justice Arabian says he does
"not think it wise for this court to venture unnecessarily into terrain more
appropriately cleared by the Legislature in the first instance."); id. at 111 (Arabian,
J., concurring) (noting that "[blecause California Legislature has not enacted the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, its provisions were not
followed in this case."); id. at 121 (Arabian, J., concurring) (opining that "the
Legislature should turn its attention to the complex issues posed by gestational
surrogacy.").
20. Id. at 96.
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these questions because of its responsibility to decide the case. 2' The
justices found that Johnson was not subject to involuntary servitude
because the Calverts did not coerce her agreement and Johnson was
not under duress at the time of the arrangement.22 The justices then
noted general concerns beyond their case-specific competence,
including: (1) psychological harm possibly caused by requiring a
gestator to relinquish the contracted child; (2) the possibility that
surrogacy contracts might exploit or dehumanize poor women; and
(3) future potential for gestational surrogacy to result in the
commoditization of children.23 After finding that these general
concerns were not so likely as to justify invalidating the Johnson-
Calvert agreement on public policy grounds, the court upheld the
contract in dispute.24
At the time of the Calvert case, feminist activists such as Janice
Raymond and Beverly Horsburg argued that the Calverts had chosen
Johnson as their surrogate because they believed that "her Black
skin" and lower socio-economic class would ensure their superior
parental claim over the resulting child." By emphasizing the lack of
necessary empirical data about the prevalence of such exploitation,
the court implicitly rejected this argument. The outcome of the case
may therefore have been different if the race and class issues had
been more thoroughly researched and debated in the democratic
process, and the court had been able to draw upon that information.
Given the international nature of our economies and
communications today, the ethical implications of surrogacy contracts
now touch not only those involved in the arrangements but the whole
of humanity. Over the past decade, a growing number of American
and European women have begun to travel to other countries, often
developing countries, in search of surrogates, which arguably changes
the tenor of the moral and political debates before the Johnson
court.26 Given the enormous amount surrogates are paid relative to
the average living wage in some of the countries where the practice is
centered, the possibility exists that the heightened financial coercion
21. Id. at 97.
22. Id. at 96.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND
THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 69 (1993).
26. See generally Lee, supra note 9.
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or duress will put some women in situations of involuntary servitude,
or that this new market is capitalizing on vestiges of colonialism.27
Political and moral philosopher Michael Sandel has argued that
advances in reproductive technologies will force everyone "to
confront questions largely lost from view in the modern world -
questions about the moral status of nature, and about the proper
stance of human beings toward the given world." 28 This argument
underscores why the UDBHR's goal of creating a regulatory middle
ground is so important, and must be accomplished by an inclusive
political process informed by careful study of the effects of the
technology.
Section III of this Note will provide an overview of the new
"international surrogacy" industry and some countries' regulatory
responses to the practice. These responses highlight the negative
consequences of government action without adequate information on
surrogacy's health and social impact or input from underrepresented
sectors of society. Section IV will analyze how the field of bioethics
analyzes the issues surrounding international surrogacy. As a result
of the shortcomings of the bioethics analytical framework, Section V
describes UNESCO's recent attempt to merge the field of human
rights with bioethics in order to create a more comprehensive analysis
and greater protection for vulnerable populations across the globe.
Finally, Section VI introduces and advocates for regulations that
incorporate the principles of biopolitics, which more comprehensively
inform the debate about regulating biotechnology generally, and
international surrogacy specifically, through the democratic political
process.
III. The Various Government Responses to International
Surrogacy
Competing ethical considerations inform how individuals and
communities respond to a woman in one country "renting" her womb
to gestate the zygote of a couple in another country. One response is
that it is the surrogate's individual right to use her reproductive
capacities for financial gain.29 Another response is that it is the
27. See Henry Chu, Wombs for Rent, Cheap, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006,
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/19/world/fg-surrogate-19.
28. Darnovsky, Moral Questions, supra note 10, at 101 (citing Michael J. Sandel,
THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 9 (2007)).
29. SPAR, supra note 7, at 77.
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international community's collective responsibility to prevent, or at
least to regulate, these arrangements to prevent the surrogate from
being financially or otherwise coerced into becoming a production
tool for a wealthier family." From a commercial standpoint,
"surrogacy offers a seductive way for lower-income women to profit
from their bodies without - theoretically at least - selling either their
bodies or their children."31
The business that has grown up around international surrogacy,
however, has transformed the commercial dynamic from a simple
one-on-one case of "women helping women," as Oprah Winfrey put
it in a 2007 show, to an elaborate corporate enterprise in which some
women are compensated less than others despite facing greater
medical and social risks.3 2 In the past few decades, intermediary
brokers and fertility clinics have begun to match women willing to sell
their eggs without themselves becoming pregnant with women willing
to carry and give birth to a child genetically unrelated to them." This
separating and recombining of the different elements of the
reproductive process has, economically speaking, "allowed a new
market to thrive" by "removing the traditional link between egg,
womb, and mother ... [thereby] ... reduc[ing] the legal and
emotional risks that had surrounded traditional surrogacy."
However, some countries' aggressive regulatory responses, and the
outcries against social injustices resulting from other countries' lax
regulations, illustrate that there is far from a general consensus that
the risks have in fact been reduced by this new, and now cross-border,
capitalization on technology.
30. Richard F. Storrow, The Handmaid's Tale of Fertility Tourism: Passports and
Third Parties in the Religious Regulation of Assisted Conception, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REv. 189, 204 (2005).
31. SPAR, supra note 7, at 72.
32. Jamie D. Brooks, Oprah on Renting Wombs in India: "It's beautiful",
BIOPOLITICAL TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.biopoliticaltimes.org/article.
php?id=3713.
33. SPAR, supra note 7, at 79.
34. Id. at 80.
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A. Regulatory Disuniformity Among Countries Promotes
"Outsourcing" Surrogacy Services
1. Uncertainty About the Legality of Surrogacy Contracts in the
United States Fuels the Reproductive Tourism Business
Although the individual states are all subject to the same
overarching federal constitutional parameters, state regulations on
surrogacy agreements vary widely, and as a result, there is a great
degree of uncertainty about the overall permissibility of surrogacy
contracts in the United States.35 This uncertain legal terrain has led to
international outsourcing to countries with more lax regulations.16
Legislatures in about a third of the states have responded to courts'
requests to decide whether surrogacy agreements are valid contracts
or void bargains by enacting statutes that specifically deal with
surrogacy contracts." Many of these states have altogether banned
surrogacy agreements or severely restricted their enforceability, but
federal law is still unsettled and has altered only some of these state
bans."
An Arizona statute, for example, made it illegal for a person to
"enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the
formation of" a surrogate parentage contract. In the event that
Arizona residents violated the statute by contracting for surrogacy
services, the law mandated that the surrogate would be the legal
mother entitled to custody, and if married, her husband would be
presumed to be the legal father, though that presumption could be
rebutted with genetic evidence.40 According to the Court of
Appeals's analysis of the Arizona House Committee's minutes, the
legislature "designed [the statute] to stop 'baby brokers' and to stop
the trafficking of human beings."41 Despite the laudable goal, this law
was challenged and the reviewing court held that the state's mandate
35. See Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In
Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2796 (2005).
36. See Lee, supra note 9, at 290 (noting that "[t]he confusing state of the law in
the U.S. combined with expensive legal costs to deal with surrogacy contracts are also
likely contributors to the heightened demand for fertility tourism in India.").
37. See 7 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 16:22 n.12.
38. Id.
39. Title 25: Marital and Domestic Relations, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-218(A)
(Surrogate parentage contracts; prohibition; custody; definition).
40. Id. at (C).
41. Id.
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that the surrogate be given legal status as the child's mother violated
the federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause.42 Under the statute, women who had used gestational
surrogates, and were therefore genetically related to the child in
question, could not rebut the surrogate's presumed legal parentage;
biological fathers, however, were given the opportunity to rebut the
presumption that a surrogate's husband was the legal father.43
Because of this "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are ...
similarly situated," the statute's discriminatory means to
accomplishing its objective did not pass the "strict scrutiny" test and
was held unconstitutional."
The court drew on federal case law to find that although a
gender-based distinction was at issue, the statute would be held to the
highest level of scrutiny and not the medium level of scrutiny usually
used in gender discrimination cases.45 The court referenced United
States Supreme Court case Stanley v. Illinois, which held that a
parent's right to the custody and control of one's child is a
fundamental interest guaranteed by the United States, to bolster its
finding that the state statute curtailed fundamental liberty interests
46and was unconstitutional under the applicable strict scrutiny test.
Federal law thus enabled Arizona residents to freely use technology
to exercise their fundamental right to procreate, but it did not do the
same for residents of other states.
The Michigan statute that served as a model for the Arizona law,
for example, still stands,47 as well as a very similar law in the District
of Columbia.' In fact, seven states currently ban or severely restrict
42. See Soos v. Superior Court in and for Cnty. of Maricopa, 182 Ariz. 470, 475
(1994).
43. Id. at 473.
44. Id. at 475 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)).
45. See id. at 474 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding
marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race)).
46. See generally Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
See also Doe v. Attorney Gen., 194 Mich. App. 432, 437 (1992) (citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463-64) (noting that under the strict scrutiny test, the
government can only "justify the abridgment of such a fundamental right by
demonstrating that a countervailing compelling state interest is thereby promoted
and that the means are closely tailored to the end sought to be achieved.").
47. See 7 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 16:22 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
722.851-722.863 "Surrogate Parenting Act").
48. Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 ("Surrogate parenting contracts are
262 [Vol. 35:1
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surrogacy contract, which, in addition to the uncertainty created by
disparate state and federal laws, helps explain why American couples
are beginning to look elsewhere in their search for a surrogate.49
Some state legislatures, such as those of Nevada and California,
have declined to directly address the legality of surrogacy contracts
and accordingly rely on contract law, as opposed to family law, to
adjudicate such disputes." These courts prefer the use of contracts in
this context because it "seems to put private, procreation-related
decision making in the hands of the married couple and permits the
court to simply interpret and enforce voluntary agreements."" When
courts rule on these agreements, however, they are not merely
affirming the content of a contract; rather, they are making highly
contentious "decisions about the status of embryos, the interests of
children, and the identification and responsibility of their parents."
The state-by-state variance in these decisions will continue
indefinitely as it remains unclear whether the United States Supreme
Court will ever be able to proclaim a uniform national policy due to a
modern line of cases reaffirming that "certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests," including the "right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children," get
heightened protection against government interference.13  If the
Supreme Court were to decide on a uniform rule about the
permissibility of surrogacy contracts, it would likely use the doctrine
of "substantive due process" to protect individual choice in the matter
because it has applied this doctrine to other reproductive rights areas
such as abortion and use of contraception.54 But this individual choice
model works best when people are adequately informed about the
prohibited and rendered unenforceable in the District"; the statute imposes penalties
one who is "involved in, or induces, arranges or otherwise assists in the formation of
a surrogacy parenting contract" for compensation)).
49. See Smerdon, supra note 2, at n.77.
50. See Lee, supra note 9, at 289-90 (citing RADHIKA RAO, SURROGACY LAw IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE OUTCOME OF AMBIVALENCE, in SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23 (Rachel Cook et al. eds., 2003)).
51. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 56.
52. Id. at 141-42.
53. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (discussing fundamental
rights and liberty interests); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (discussing parental decisions concerning care and custody of children)
(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
54. SPAR, supra note 7, at 95; see also Note, supra note 33, at 2796 (applying due
process jurisprudence to an asserted right to IVF treatment).
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complex issues they are facing. Only by studying the implications of
these new technologies and engaging civil society actors who voice
underrepresented points of view will people be able to choose wisely
or will the legislature be able to create uniform standards. Until then,
agencies that treat surrogacy as a purely profit-driven business will be
able to circumvent restrictive laws in the states."
2. European Countries' Outright Bans Fuel the "Reproductive
Tourism" Market
Surrogacy contracts are altogether banned in European
countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy.5 6  Italy, a
predominately Catholic country with more conservative social and
religious views on surrogacy, has some of the most restrictive
regulations on assisted reproductive technology generally." Italy's
Medically Assisted Reproduction Law (MARP) was enacted in
December 2003 to counter the country's reputation for being the
"Wild West" of fertility treatments.58  MARP sharply curtailed
fertility services by banning sperm and egg donation, embryo
freezing, and surrogate motherhood altogether, while simultaneously
limiting the fertility services that were still available to "stable"
heterosexual couples who were shown to be infertile."
55. See Lee, supra note 9, at 290.
56. See SPAR, supra note 7, at 71.
57. See Dr. Jess Buxton, Restrictive fertility law forces Italian patients abroad,
BIONEWS, Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_12942.asp.
58. Id. ("This law was passed in March 2004 and had restricted fertility treatment
in Italy, prompting many Italians to travel abroad for treatment."). See also Dominic
Standish, Infertile democracy, SPIKEDONLINE (June 16, 2005), http://www.spiked-
online.com/index.php/site/article/841/.
59. Dr. Mauro Costa, Comment to The Italian law on medically assisted
reproduction: one year on, BioNEWS, June 5, 2005,
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_37804.asp
("Pregnancy rates have, in fact, decreased from 33.4 to 18.6 per cent and
from 32.4 to 18.4 per cent respectively [at the Reproductive Biology Unit of
Plaermo and the SISMER Center of Bologna]. This fall is due to the fact
that in the past, these two IVF units routinely used embryo freezing....
These new rules reduce the chances of obtaining good quality embryos, and
prevent the discarding of embryos with low implantation potential. The fact
that all embryos must be returned to the womb explains the rise of abortion.
... Interestingly, the number of treated couples decreased from 2418 to 1746
in the same study period (March-October 2003 / March-October 2004),
reflecting the fact that some patients are deciding to travel to other countries
for fertility treatment.. . . Forum of Genetic and Reproduction Associations
in Milan, Rome and Bologna shows that almost 25 per cent of couples
decide to apply to foreign private and public Centres. The researchers
264 [Vol. 35:1
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Italian lawmakers were most likely motivated by religious
concerns and pressure from constituents focused on "reinscribing
the nuclear family as the only proper locus for procreation or
investing embryos with personhood."" The gravity of these social
values is evident from the fact that the law goes so far as to penalize
"physicians who publicize locations abroad where egg donation is
available."6  This drastic legislative action has led to a drop in the
success rate of Italian infertility treatment and has spurred Italians'
participation in the international surrogacy industry in other
countries.63
In mid-June 2005, Italians had the opportunity to vote for a
referendum that would change or eliminate the most restrictive
aspects of MARP, but the voter turnout fell short of the required fifty
percent of the population.' The low participation rate was largely
attributed to the Church's campaign against the referendum - an
Independent headline read "Vatican victorious after boycott over
fertility referendum" and the Reuters news agency titled a newswire
"Catholic Church victorious in Italy fertility vote."" This failed
opportunity to use the democratic political process to incorporate
underrepresented points of view is indicative of the larger problem of
interviewed 324 of these couples ... . The survey showed that Italian couples
are travelling to the following countries: Spain: 25 per cent England: 20 per
cent Belgium 18 per cent Switzerland: 10 per cent Austria: 10 per cent
Slovenia: 5 per cent France, Ukraine, Malta and Cyprus: 12 per cent
combined.").
60. See, e.g., Storrow, supra note 30, at 306 (citing John A. Robertson, Protecting
Embryos and Burdening Women: Assisted Reproduction in Italy, 19 HuM. REPROD.
1693, 1694 (2004)
("One explanation no doubt is the strong opposition of the Vatican to
gamete donation because of the fear that third party provision of oocyte or
sperm will weaken family bonds and confuse the heritage of children....
What is clear, though, is that Roman Catholic doctrine is not the sole
template for the policy. That doctrine, which condemns procreation not
arising from intercourse in marriage, would proscribe even AIH.")).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 307.
63. See Costa, supra note 59.
64. See Standish, supra note 58.
65. Peter Popham, Vatican Victorious After Boycott Over Fertility Referendum,
THE INDEPENDENT, June 14, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/vatican-victorious-after-boycott-over-fertility-referendum-494102.html;
Shasta Darlington, Church Victorious in Italian Fertility Vote, REUTERS, June 13,
2005, available at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20050614/local/church-
victorious-in-italian-fertility-vote.
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acquiescence to a limited number of authorities' points of view. The
experience highlighted the fact that bringing complicated issues
directly to the people in such a polarized political environment can
undermine the goal of elucidating different perspectives. In an effort
to temper such polarization and thereby engage different perspectives
in the debate, advocacy organizations such as Sama in India and Isha
L'Isha in Israel concentrate on providing health and social impact
data as well as advocating underrepresented points of view in national
and international regulatory fora.66
3. India's Lack of Regulations on the Surrogacy Industry Has Led
to Social Injustice, Negative Health Consequences, and
Sama's Campaign to Correct These Ills
Where surrogacy is highly regulated in some parts of Europe and
the United States, the opposite is true in India, which has led to
Westerners' increased demand for Indian surrogates over the past
decade.6 ' This cross-border arrangement can confer benefits on both
sides of the bargaining table; for example, the surrogate gets paid an
amount equivalent to multiple years of a schoolteacher's salary for a
nine-month commitment, and the commissioning parents pay a
fraction of what they would to a United States surrogate while
avoiding the potential legal complications discussed in Section III. A.
1.68 A former health secretary in Gujarat state called the situation a
''win-win . . . completely capitalistic enterprise" and fervently denied
that there was anything unethical about the arrangement. But there
66. See SAMA RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, http://
www.samawomenshealth.org (last accessed Nov. 9, 2011) (explaining that Sama
"seeks to locate the concerns of women's health and well-being in the larger context
of socio-historical, economic and political realities.").
67. See Chu, supra note 27 (explaining that some view outsourcing of surrogacy
services to India as a logical development in the trend towards outsourcing that first
began with Western businesses).
68. Id.
(Noting that in the case of Saroj Mehli of Anand, India, "[s]he'll be paid
about $5,000 for acting as a surrogate mother, a bonanza that would take her
more than six years to earn on her salary as a schoolteacher in a village near
here. . . . Beyond the money, she said, there is the reward of bringing
happiness to a childless couple in the United States, where such a service
would cost them thousands of dollars more, not to mention the potential
legal hassles.").
69. Id. ("It's win-win," said S.K. Nanda, a former health secretary here in
Gujarat state. "It's a completely capitalistic enterprise. There is nothing unethical
about it. If you launched it somewhere like West Bengal or Assam" - both poverty-
stricken states - "you'd have a lot of takers.").
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are ethical and medical downsides to the practice, such as the
potential exploitation of a large group of economically disadvantaged
families and heightened health risks for surrogates in a land where
100,000 women die every year as a result of pregnancy and
childbirth.0 The Indian government has weighed in on the debate,
though not in the manner or to the extent necessary to ensure
comprehensive protection for the vulnerable populations involved.
In September 2008, a twelve-member committee, comprised
primarily of medical experts from the Indian Council of Medical
Research and the Ministry of Health, released a draft of India's
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill and Rules (the Draft Bill).'
The Draft Bill contains many specifications regarding what medical
expenses can be paid by the commissioning parties, the allowable age
of the surrogate, the number of times a woman can serve as a
surrogate, the requirement that the birth certificate bear the name of
the commissioning parents, and protections for the child such as the
commissioning parents' legal obligation "to accept the child
regardless of any abnormality the child may have.",7  But the Draft
Bill has also received public criticism for having been written by a
medico-business lobby and as such, primarily promoting the interests
of that lobby to the detriment of protections for the rights and health
of the women and children involved. For example, women's health
advocacy group Sama has published a letter to the Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare highlighting the Draft Bill's contradictory
language, its promotion of eugenic practices, and its downplaying of
the serious medical risks to which egg donors are subjected.74
70. Id.
71. See Smerdon, supra note 2, at 42 (citing The Assisted Reproductive
Technology (Regulation) Bill, 2008, available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/
media/vikas-doc/docs/1241500084--DraftARTBill.pdf).
72. Id. at 42-43.
73. Id.
74. See SAMA RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, Comments and
Suggestions on the ART (Regulation) Bill and Rules-2008, Dec. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.samawomenshealth.org/downloads/ART%20Bill%20CritiqueSama.pdf.
Sama notes that it is unclear in the Bill whether the Semen Bank or the
commissioning couple/individual is responsible for compensating the surrogate,
where the oocyte retrieval and screening process take place, and there is a
discrepancy about whether the minimum age for egg donation is 18 or 21. Id. at 2-3.
Sama also noted that the Bill promotes eugenics through donor matching in Clause
20(4) wherein legislators specified that either party to the surrogacy contract is
entitled to information about gamete donors' height, weight, ethnicity, skin colour,
educational background, and medical history. Id. at 6. Additionally, Rule 6.13 states
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Fortunately, Sama is a member of national and international
movements such as the global People's Health Movement (PHM), the
National Network of Autonomous Women's Groups (NNAWG), and
National Bioethics Conference (NBC)." The continued efforts of
similar groups is an effective means by which to help ensure that the
political process is adequately informed and the future rules for this
booming industry better address the complex issues and interests
involved.
4. The Israeli Surrogacy Regulatory System Is Touted as a Model,
but Its Isolation from the Democratic Political Process Leaves
It Room to Improve
Israel has received accolades for incorporating both religious and
civil law in its "proactive approach to regulating commercial
surrogacy ... that creates uniform industry standards, medical
standards, and a legal structure to prevent exploitation." To be
certain, there are positives to Israel's approach. By providing a
comprehensive, partly state-funded system for surrogacy services, it
reduces the incentive for commissioning parents to engage in
potentially exploitative "reproductive tourism."" It still fails,
however, to democratically incorporate popular viewpoints on the
implicated moral and political dilemmas and places supremacy on
individual rights instead of engaging in a broader discussion of social
justice.
The highly publicized Ruti Nahmani case in the early 1990s was
the first to spark public discussion in Israel about the ethical and legal
dilemmas of gestational surrogacy," while simultaneously prompting
the inconsistent governing laws that are still in effect. In the Nahmani
case, Ruti and her husband underwent IVF treatments and the
hospital at which the procedures were performed retained property
that "ARTs carry small risks both to the mother and the offspring." Sama identifies
the following associated life-threatening risks in the surrogacy process: multiple
gestation, ectopic pregnancy, and spontaneous abortion. Id. at 9.
75. See SAMA RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, Campaigns and
Advocacy..., http://www.samawomenshealth.org/campaigns.html (last accessed Nov.
11,2011).
76. Lee, supra note 9, at 277.
77. Id. at 295.
78. Id. at 293.
79. See SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IN ISRAEL 64 (2000).
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rights over the resulting embryos.' After Ruti's separation from her
husband, she sued the hospital for custody of embryos, hoping to
raise them alone after her surrogate gave birth." She eventually won
the right to use the embryos in a surrogacy arrangement without her
husband's consent, however, her husband appealed the decision,
arguing that he had been denied his right to choose whether or not to
become a parent.' Supreme Court Justice Tova Strassberg-Cohen
agreed, writing "a man cannot be contractually forced to become a
parent, since this would violate his fundamental human rights."'
Where the Israeli judiciary relied on the husband's individual right to
be free from coercion to prevent a surrogacy arrangement, the
legislature adopted overarching control over the country's surrogacy
market, thereby facilitating the arrangements.
The problem with the government's regulatory system is that it
fails to take into account the viewpoints of the very people it seeks to
protect. During the Nahmani case, Israeli legislators, rabbis, and
fertility specialists worked "behind closed doors to hammer out
recommendations for the appropriate uses of reproductive
technology."" In addition to the government response taking place in
isolation from the conventional political process, the regulatory
system it created was an administrative agency system not subject to
standard democratic control." Reproductive technology regulations
cannot be directly proposed by legislation; rather, the regulations
issue from a legislatively appointed agency that also has the power to
license or set conditions for assisted reproduction services. 86 Officials
in the Ministry of Health adopt secondary legislation and
administrative directives that then govern the administration of the
technology." For example, the administrative "Approvals
Committee" is responsible for judicial review and formal approval of
surrogacy contracts in order to ensure that gestational surrogates are
80. Id. at 66.
81. Id. at 64.
82. Id. at 66.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 64-65.
85. Id. at 75.
86. Id. (citing Bernard Dickens as writing that reproductive technology
regulations "may be proposed by legislation not directly, but by the legislative
appointment of an agency empowered to license or set conditions for the operation
of assisted reproduction services.").
87. Id.
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not being exploited and that all parties have given voluntary and
informed consent." The government also presumes that all potential
surrogate candidates are unable to objectively assess their own
suitability and thus mandates that they have an initial medical and
psychological suitability assessment by an independent professional."
Regarding permissible compensation, the Approvals Committee does
not interfere with the parties' negotiations, but the extensive review
process makes it difficult to financially exploit a surrogate."
The current system is generally thought to be a temporary fix
developed out of the "necessity to create functional legislation for a
rapidly developing technology that doctors were quickly assimilating
into their practices, both because of professional interest and because
of enormous popular demand."9' Experts in the field anticipate that
when formal laws are enacted by the Parliament, access to and
control over reproductive technology may become limited.92 This is
primarily attributed to the fact that in the conventional legislative
process, the orthodox rabbinical establishment could exercise its
considerable political influence to enact stricter laws, as was the case
in Italy.9'
As it turns out, the Israeli feminist organization Isha L'Isha
advocates not for regulation based on inclusive political participation,
but for a total prohibition on surrogacy based on its argument that the
practice is an "objectifying and impersonal use of the surrogate
mother's body." 94 In the context of Israel's procreation-centric social
atmosphere, Isha L'Isha believes that mainstreaming surrogacy
contracts only strengthens the message that motherhood should be
the center of women's lives, and makes acceptance of infertility even
more difficult by heightening social pressure to invest all available
resources in attempts to achieve parenthood.95
Despite the organization's primary hardline stance, it provides
valuable information and perspective to the national and
88. Lee, supra note 9, at 296.
89. Id. at 296-97.
90. Id. at 297-98.
91. KAHN, supra note 78, at 75.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 75-76.
94. NUPHAR LIPKIN & ETri SAMAMA, SURROGACY IN ISRAEL: STATUS REPORT
2010 & PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT 5, available at http://
www.isha.org.il/upload/file/surrogacyEngOO%5B1%5D.pdfl.
95. Id. at 5-6.
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international community. Failing prohibition, Isha l'Isha advocates
for substantial changes to the long-standing law, which now only
permits surrogacy solicitation by heterosexual couples comprised of
fertile men whose female partners cannot become pregnant or cannot
(safely) carry a pregnancy." For example, the organization urges
liberalizing payment guidelines to reflect the time invested, degree of
risk exposure and physical discomfort involved." Isha L'Isha also
advocates that Israeli citizens not be permitted to take part in any
procedure overseas that is not permitted in Israel. 98 Isha L'Isha's
advocacy work provides a valuable civil society perspective on
legislative changes that, based on careful study of the current law's
social impact, it believes would make the commercial surrogacy
arrangement fairer.
5. The Feasibility of Incorporating Underrepresented Points of
View in United States Biotechnology Regulations
While there is a tolerance of diverse points of view in the Uni'ted
States, some have argued that beginning in the 1960s or 1970s, public
debate over moral issues became "thinner" as a result of Americans'
recognition "that we live in a pluralistic society with many competing
conceptions of the 'good life."' 9 To accommodate these varying
points of view, Americans "created a neutral, 'thin' third language
that was to be used in debates over policies that would affect all
Americans, using values and forms of argument shared by all
citizens."1" So while Roman Catholics, for example, would still
continue to argue about substantive moral and ethical concerns
among themselves, they would translate their "thick" debate into a
"thin" shared language when they entered the public discourse.
The "thinning" of moral and ethical discourse led to the rise of a
new profession, bioethics, which embraced this form of argument.
Bioethicists' voices have recently been dominant in American and
international discourse on the topic of reproductive technology, as
exemplified by the expert United States government's bioethics
advisory commissions on human genetic engineering and UNESCO's
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 31.
99. JOHN H. EVANS, PLAYING GOD?: HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC BIOETHICAL DEBATE 5 (2002).
100. Id.
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UDBHR in the international arena.1o' The unfortunate consequence
of focusing on the neutral language of bioethics, as the following
section will show, is that pertinent topics such as racism, classism, and
countries' colonial histories are left out of the debate and
unaccounted for in the regulations meant to protect vulnerable
populations.
IV. How Bioethics Analyzes Surrogacy
A. A History of the Field
The field of bioethics emerged to protect vulnerable populations
from abuses in human experimentation and state-run eugenics
programs.' 02  Initially, bioethics professionals' work had limited
jurisdiction; as a result of the field's conception in the post-World
War II Nuremberg Doctors' Trial, it was confined to the ethical
analysis of experiments using human subjects.03 The core component
of the Nuremberg tribunal's opinion was the formulation of the
Nuremberg Code - a list of ten principles written "in an attempt to
establish the substantive standards and procedural guidelines for
permissible medical experimentation with humans."'a But when
originally conceived, these rules were not identified as a code of
medical ethics. Rather, they were a part of a final legal judgment
against the Nazi doctors' abuse of prisoners and their ex post facto
application to the defendants' horrific experiments was justified on
the ground that the principles were "derived from the 'natural law' of
all people."' Thus, the inception of the field of bioethics was
contemporaneous with the inception of human rights. In fact, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the
United Nations (UN) just two years after the Doctors' Trial began
and it similarly identified rights and principles derived from a
nonhuman source, thereby justifying their universal application to all
101. Id. at 7.
102. See Paul Root Wolpe, The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A
Sociological View, in BIOETHICS IN SOCIETY: CONSTRUCTING A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
39 (Raymond DeVries et al. eds., 1998).
103. Id.
104. Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTS
121 (G.J. Annas & M.A. Grodin eds., 1992).
105. Id.
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humans, simply by virtue of being human.1'e
As human medical experiments such as those at Tuskegee and
the Fernald and Wrentham Schools drew critical attention in the
United States in the decades after World War II, efforts to divine
substantive rights fell by the wayside as bioethicists worked on
developing a coherent analytical framework for protecting vulnerable
populations in many different contexts." The "principlism"
approach articulated in Tom Beauchamp and James Childress's 1977
book Principles of Biomedical Ethics "became the document in
bioethics most resembling a common disciplinary charter."'" The
four principles: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence,
and justice, became the common tools for evaluating ethical dilemmas
as well as combating information and power asymmetries between
patients and medical or other science professionals." The principles
accomplished this by "shift[ing focus] towards the moral agency of the
patient" and establishing procedural rules, rather than substantive
mandates, by which bioethicists would evaluate ethical dilemmas."o
As technology advanced, patients became increasingly
vulnerable to doctors' and scientists' expertise because the widening
information gap left them unable to identify and oppose innovations
they might deem morally offensive if they were fully informed."'
That vulnerability shifted from the individual patient context to the
global community context with the invention of recombinant DNA
techniques in the 1970s.112 In 1975, a group of bioethicists convened in
Asilomar, California to discuss safety issues arising out of the new
technique's use in research.113 This focus on larger ethical issues
expanded bioethics' professional jurisdiction from individual patient
protection to weighing global concerns about the future of the human
race, but the principles of bioethics remained tailored to individual
patient contexts.14
106. Id. at 132.
107. See Wolpe, supra note 102, at 41.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 39.
111. See Sally Satel, The Limits of Bioethics, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., Feb. 2, 2010,
available at http://www.aei.orglarticle/101603.
112. See Roger B. Dworkin, Science, Society, and the Expert Town Meeting: Some
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Today, there is disagreement as to whether bioethical analysis
has a place in the creation of international political regulations. Some
bioethicists advocate for their professional colleagues to adopt an
aggressive pursuit of international social justice by focusing on
reducing disparities in health, wealth, and other resources among
populations across the world."' Other bioethicists argue that the
principles of bioethics are incapable of fully realizing such a
jurisdictional transformation because they are designed for advocates
of disinterested moral deliberation"' who should ideally refrain from
making pronouncements in individuals' moral dilemmas."' This
school of thought argues that bioethics has no place in international
law or social policy, which are made by political agents and
governments who should make conclusive political decisions when
the situation involves issues of social justice."' Indeed, the need for
conclusive political decisions regarding international law and social
policy is precisely why the UN was formed in the aftermath of World
War II.
Using the traditional four principles of bioethics to evaluate
issues surrounding international surrogacy contracts, the following
section illustrates just how "thin" the debate is when led by
bioethicists. If a variety of political constituents were to participate in
a broader political discussion, and had community health and social
impact data upon which to draw, pertinent issues such as racism,
classism, and vestiges of colonialism would not be left out of the
moral and ethical calculus, and better regulations would result.
115. See Satel, supra note 111, at 5.
116. Id.
117. See Satel, supra note 111, at 4.
118. See R. Adorno, Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 150, 151 (2007)
("[I]t would be a mistake to assess with purely academic criteria an
instrument such as the declaration, which is not the exclusive product of
academic work, but rather a kind of compromise between a theoretical
conceptualization made by experts and what is practically achievable given
the political choices of governments. We need to keep in mind that
governments, not independent experts, have the last word in every
declaration or convention issued by UN agencies.").
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B. Application of Bioethics Principles to the Case of International
Surrogacy
1. Respect for Autonomy
Beauchamp and Childress assert that "[tlo violate a person's
autonomy is to treat that person merely as a means; that is, in
accordance with others' goals without regard to that person's own
goals."" 9 In the case of international surrogacy, there is a cultural
divide over whether couples seeking a surrogate are exclusively
focused on furthering their own goals. In the United States, longtime
critic of assisted reproductive technology, Janice Raymond, believes
that many states have not banned or heavily regulated surrogacy
because the United States legal history of "respect for reproductive
choice" has led to Americans' hopeful view of surrogacy "as work
done by happy and altruistic women who do it not only for the money
but for the joy they give to others."'20 This United States commitment
to reproductive choice has been condemned as being "in the worst
tradition of both U.S. individualism and U.S. isolationism because it
makes no connection between how such a supposed right will affect
women's rights ... around the world."12 1 In countries in which social
and economic conditions are drastically different than those in the
United States, surrogates may not agree to carry another's child
because of a laudable goal like helping other women, or even the
more morally questionable goal of earning money.122 Rather, they
may feel forced into the transaction because of limited employment
opportunities and dire life circumstances as in the case of Nirmala, a
woman from Chandigarh, India, who announced in 1997 that she
would carry a child for 50,000 rupees and use the money to procure
much-needed medical treatment for her paralyzed husband. 123
A central tenet of Beauchamp and Childress' principle of respect
for autonomy is that the surrogate's actions must be voluntary, that is,
119. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 103 (6th ed.
2009).
120. Raymond, supra note 25, at 144.
121. Id.
122. See Brooks, supra note 32.
123. See Sandhya Srinivasan, Surrogacy Comes out of the Closet, SUNDAY TIMES
OF INDIA, (July 6, 1997), available at http://www.womenstudies.in/elib/fertility/
frsurrogacy-comes.pdf; see also Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta, Towards Transnational
Feminisms: Some Reflections and Concerns in Relation to the Globalization of
Reproductive Technologies, 13 EUR. J. WOMEN'S STUD. 23, 30 (2006).
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not "under the control of another's influence."124 But as Beauchamp
and Childress explain, "[w]e typically make decisions in a context of
competing influences, such as personal desires, familial constraints,
legal obligations, and institutional pressures.... [and t]hese
influences usually do not control decisions to a morally worrisome
degree."125 In fact, only "informational manipulation" (the deliberate
act of withholding or managing information to alter a person's
understanding of a situation and thereby motivate him or her to do
what the agent of influence intends) is specifically cited as
incompatible with autonomous decision-making.'26
Whether information manipulation is a common problem in the
formation of some international surrogacy agreements has not yet
been studied. More information is also needed about factors such as
class, race, other available employment opportunities, and familial
obligations or needs in different communities in order to assess
whether financial gain could be considered a "goal" of the surrogate's
to be respected or whether the surrogate's decision to carry the child
was a result of her free will and autonomy having already been
undermined by her circumstances.'27 Beauchamp and Childress'
principles, in conjunction with a lack of adequate information, may
mask important insights into social justice via an exclusive focus on
the individual involved instead of the greater social and economic
forces at work. Fortunately, Sama is working to change bioethics. As
a member of the organizing committee of the National Bioethics
Conference, Sama has organized a workshop on "Perspectives in
feminist bioethics on new reproductive and genetic technologies,"
which brings to light underrepresented points of view and valuable
health and social impact data.28
2. Nonmaleficence/Beneficence
The principle of nonmaleficence, that "one ought not to inflict
evil or harm," is generally used by Beauchamp and Childress in the
124. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 119, at 132.
125. Id. at 133.
126. Id. at 133-34.
127. Nicola Smith, Inside India's international baby farm, THE TIMES (May 9,
2010), available at http://www.geneticsandsociety.orglarticle.php?id=5192 ("If it is
poverty that compels the women to put their bodies through the physical and
emotional stress of pregnancy, then how can this be fully their choice?").
128. SAMA RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, Campaign around
Bioethics. . ., http://www.samawomenshealth.org/advbioethics.html.
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context of withholding treatment from a hospitalized patient and thus
* * 129
may not be applicable to the international surrogacy scenario.
Beauchamp and Childress' definition of harm is when "X's action had
an adverse effect on Y's interests."' Under this definition, people
can be wronged without being harmed since harming does not signify
a violation of rights.'"' Therefore, if a surrogate's human rights are
violated, the principle of nonmaleficence has not necessarily been
violated unless those rights pertain to one's interest in health and
survival. 132
Thus, the bioethical analysis is superficial; so long as the women's
health and survival is not harmed during the surrogacy, then those
participating in the surrogacy arrangements have improved their
welfare in accordance with the principle of beneficence.' But what
constitutes harm to health and survival? For some women, being
denied the opportunity to be a surrogate could mean a setback to the
health and survival of themselves and their families. For example, at
one of India's surrogacy clinics, the women "are mainly of lower caste
and from impoverished nearby villages. The pay they can hope to
receive following a birth is equivalent to over 10 years' salary for rural
Indians" who face a shortage of work opportunities because of the
restrictive social and economic system in the country."' Bioethics
principles once again leave out important social justice
considerations, but more importantly, they apply a generalized
balancing of interests to cases that require individual determination,
or at least the opportunity for those individuals to be represented in
the democratic political process via civil society advocacy groups.
3. Justice
Although Indian surrogates may earn as much as ten years'
salary with one pregnancy, they are still earning substantially less
than their American counterparts.135 This leads to concerns about
whether the principle of justice is violated as the economically
disadvantaged have a comparatively larger financial incentive to
129. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 119, at 151.
130. Id. at 152.
131. Id.
132. Id. (explaining that some ethical theories "view harms exclusively as setbacks
to . .. health and survival").
133. Id. at 197.
134. Smith, supra note 127, at 3.
135. See Smerdon, supra note 2, at 32.
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participate in an activity they might otherwise not.136 Indeed some
believe that the "relative costs involved in the surrogacy process are
probably the largest incentive for foreigners to travel to India" as
total costs for contracting with a United States surrogate fluctuate
between $59,000 and $80,000 while total costs for contracting with an
Indian surrogate reportedly range between $10,000 and $35 ,000.m37
Though Beauchamp and Childress focus on a one-on-one
patient-doctor relationship in their discussion of justice, they do
define the formal principle of justice as mandating that "persons
equal in whatever respects are the relevant respects should be treated
equally."1 8  The principles of bioethics do not contemplate
compensation for surrogacy services as a "relevant respect,"13 ' but
there is a potentially applicable safeguard for the economically
disadvantaged built into principlism's theory of justice - protections
for vulnerable human research subjects at risk of exploitation.'40
If the international community were to treat surrogates as human
research subjects, particularly in pharmaceutical trials, then the
principles of bioethics would offer a useful analysis for appropriate
compensation. United States bioethicists have a "Common Rule"
that requires investigators to minimize the possibility of coercion and
undue inducement when contracting with research subjects, but it
does not define or explain coercion or inducement.14 ' Beauchamp
and Childress offer a balancing test to help clarify these concepts:
"inducements become increasingly problematic as (1) risks are
increased, (2) more attractive inducements are introduced, and (3)
136. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 119, at 255.
137. Smerdon, supra note 2, at 32-33 (citing Jamie D. Brooks, Oprah on Renting
Wombs in India: "It's Beautiful," supra note 32 ($70,000); Mike Celizic, More and
More Couples Finding Surrogates in India, TODAYSHOW.COM (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/23252624/ns/today-today-healthl/t/more-more-
couples-finding-surrogates-indial ($80,000 in U.S. for surrogacy); and Radha Sharma,
UK Spinster Rents Womb in Anand!, TIMES OF INDIA, May 10, 2008,
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-05-10/ahmedabad/
27776569_1_surrogate-mother-janice-infertility (total costs for surrogacy reported to
be $15,000 compared to an estimated $100,000 in the United Kingdom)).
138. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 119, at 242.
139. Id. (Examples given primarily focus on access to health services and other
"fundamental needs" in their discussion of material principles of justice that specify
relevant characteristics for equal treatment.)
140. Id. at 253.
141. Id. at 255.
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the subjects' economic disadvantage is increased."142 The principle of
justice thereby dictates that to avoid exploiting surrogates,
commissioning parents and medical middlemen should not solicit
women who are situationally disadvantaged and without viable
employment or compensation alternatives.
But Beauchamp and Childress alternatively emphasize the need
to keep in mind that "[n]othing about economically disadvantaged
persons justifies their exclusion, as a group, from participation in
research . . . [or] from participation in any legal activity."1 43  A
categorical exclusion of the economically disadvantaged would be "an
inexcusable, paternalistic form of discrimination and deprivation of
fair opportunity that may serve to further marginalize, deprive,
stigmatize, or discriminate against them."'" Thus there is no definite
answer to the problem of international surrogacy to be found in the
principle of justice; it merely circles the debate back to its starting
point about whether the individual's rights or collective action to
ensure social justice is the supreme concern. Perhaps the best
guidance is to be found in recommendations like those from Isha
L'Isha that advocate a consideration of time invested and degree of
risk exposure and physical discomfort involved.'45
The international community now needs to take a hardline
stance on commercial surrogacy contracts that "elevate the common
good and public responsibility over excessive individualism and
consumerist identities."146 In the case of human research subject
protections, "the human rights revolution of the twentieth century
[brought about by the events of World War II and the Holocaust] has
clearly established that doctors .. . owe their primary loyalty to the
requirements of international law, rather than to the dictates of
domestic codes." 47 The world has not yet had a surrogacy atrocity
analogous to the Holocaust to spur us into action, which is why the
international community must seize the opportunity to stave off such
142. Id. at 255-56.
143. Id. at 254.
144. Id.
145. See LIPKIN & SAMAMA, supra note 91, at 23.
146. Marcy Darnovsky, Political Science: Progressives can't - and shouldn't -
remove politics and values from science, 13 DEMOCRACY J. 36, 46 (2009), available at
http://www.democracyjournal.org/13/6700.php.
147. Matthew Lippman, The Nazi Doctors Trial and the International Prohibition
on Medical Involvement in Torture, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 395, 441
(1992-1993).
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potentially cataclysmic consequences by studying the impact of
current practices, listening to those who are most directly affected by
the market, and incorporating their voices into the democratic
legislative process. This could give nations' elected political leaders
the requisite guidance needed to advocate for substantive
international regulations in UNESCO or another international body.
V. Human Rights Perspectives
UNESCO's UDBHR is the "first international legal, though
non-binding, instrument that comprehensively deals with the linkage
between human rights and bioethics" in an attempt to create a more
complete system to protect vulnerable populations globally.'48
Despite its laudable goal, UNESCO received mixed reviews for its
undertaking. The editors of Developing World Bioethics editorialized
that the document was "disappointingly vague and lacking in force"
in key areas.' 9 The Director of Ethics at the World Medical
Association described the UDBHR as a major disappointment
because "it lists desirable goals without specifying how they can be
achieved [and] for the most part [it] does not even identify, much less
resolve, the major issues in bioethics., 50  But other authors
appreciated the value of formally responding to the challenges raised
by the biotechnological triumphs of the age. An author from the
journal Medicine and Law applauded the UDBHR for neither
altogether permitting nor banning unknown future technologies, but
instead finding a middle ground that "projects human dignity into the
international sphere" and "moves up global poverty to the
international human rights agenda."m'
Instead of merging bioethics' principles with substantive human
rights norms, however, the UDBHR simply rewrites bioethics
principles in the vague language of "fundamental human rights"
drawn from a multiplicity of universal and international conventions
148. R. Adorno, supra note 118, at 150.
149. Harald Schmidt, Bioethics, Human Rights and Universalisation: a Troubled
Relationship?, in LEGITIMATION ETHISCHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM RECHT -
INTERDISZIPLINARE UNTERSUCHUNGEN 2 (S. Silja Voneky et al eds., 2008), available
at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdfl schmidtmitcopyright.pdf.
150. Id. at 2-3.
151. Solomon E. Salako, The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights: Protecting Future Generations and the Quest for a Global Consensus,
27 MED. & L. 805, 809 (2008).
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and declarations.5 2 Essentially, the UDBHR uses human rights, in all
their various forms, as a tool for creating a common discourse in
much the same way Beauchamp and Childress used the four
principles of bioethics to "enhance calculability or ... to simplify
bioethical decisionmaking." 53 The unfortunate consequence of this
simplification is that in order to respect the diversity of "thick
debates" that take place in the many signatory nations, the
declaration does not announce substantive rights but rather serves as
a procedural mechanism by which leaders in individual nations can
engage in discussion and debate by focusing on the lingua franca of
human rights. What the international community needs is a
determination of what fundamental rights people have with respect to
private and contractual use of their reproductive capabilities that is
informed by inclusive democratic deliberation first in individual
states' legislatures and then in the United Nations General Assembly.
A. What the UDBHR Should Accomplish
An example of the UDBHR's failure to mandate a substantive
public policy to ensure social justice is its lack of proscription of
nearly universally prohibited biotechnologies such as human
cloning.154 The Council of Europe's 1998 Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine prohibited reproductive human cloning,
inheritable genetic modification, and sex selection for nonmedical
purposes based on an appeal to "human rights and fundamental
freedoms."' Similarly, at the signing of the Stem Cell Executive
Order in March of 2009, President Obama condemned human
reproductive cloning on the grounds that "[i]t is dangerous,
profoundly wrong, and has no place in our society, or any society."'
These patently prohibited biotechnologies are those that have
152. Id. at 808.
153. John H. Evans, A Sociological Account of the Growth of Principlism, 5
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 32 (2000).
154. See Salako, supra note 151, at 815.
155. Darnovsky, Moral Questions, supra note 10, at 109-110 (citing Council of
Europe, Convention for the Protection, supra note 11, pmbl.
("Unlike the United States, Europe has explicitly prohibited the human
biotechnology practices that generate the most concern, including
reproductive human cloning, inheritable genetic modification, and sex
selection for nonmedical purposes. These prohibitions are justified by an
appeal to 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' in the Council of
Europe's 1998 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.")).
156. President Barack Obama, supra note 12.
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the potential to manipulate the traits of future children and
generations, thus recreating the Nazi medical eugenics movement that
initially spurred the creation of bioethics and human rights.'
Unfortunately, the UDBHR makes no substantive proclamations on
these technologies, which is dangerous given the small but vocal
group of proponents of a new eugenics movement. For example,
James Watson, a recipient of the Nobel Prize for his part in deducing
the structure of DNA, told colleagues at a 1998 conference that the
idea that the human gene pool should not be genetically engineered
was "utter silliness. We should treat other people in a way that
maximizes the common good of the human species.""' But the
evolutionary-controlling technologies Watson advocates have the
ability to deepen the divide between the "haves" and the "have-nots,"
which does not maximize the common good of the human species
according to other schools of thought. Similarly, in the case of
international surrogacy, the exploitation and perpetuation of race and
class divisions that possibly advance a new colonial structure does not
maximize the common good of the human species, and should be
substantively regulated by an international regulation with more force
than the current UDBHR.
The central tension in the UDBHR is that while it states that
decision-making about the use of biotechnologies must be subject to
"informed pluralistic public debate"159 that considers the impact
technologies will have on future generations,'" it also calls for respect
for cultural diversity and pluralism that would prevent exactly the
uniformity it purports to advance.' 6 ' The only truly uniform rules it
announces are in Article 3(1), which states that "human dignity,
157. See Darnovsky, Moral Questions, supra note 10, at 100; Salako, supra note
151, at 807.
158. Darnovsky, Moral Questions, supra note 10, at 115 (citing James D. Watson,
THE ROAD AHEAD: A PANEL DISCUSSION, IN ENGINEERING THE HUMAN GENOME 73,
85 (Gregory Stock & John Campbell eds., 2000)
("I can't indicate how silly I think [the sanctity of the gene pool] is. I mean,
we have great respect for the human species.. .. But saying we're sacred and
should not be changed? Evolution can be just damn cruel, and to say that
we've got a perfect genome and there's some sanctity? I'd like to know
where that idea comes from, because it's utter silliness. We should treat
other people in a way that maximizes the common good of the human
species. That's about all we can do.")).
159. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, supra note 11, art.
18(3).
160. Id. art. 16.
161. Id. art. 12.
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human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected,"
and Article 3(2), which states that "the interests and welfare of the
individual should have priority over the interests of science or
society."l 6 2  The latter mandate merely announces the highly
subjective rule that science should not exploit people. The reference
to respect for individual human rights would seem to be the rule most
apt to satisfy the quest for substantive protections; however, it is
fatally flawed because the UDHR contains conflicting human rights
that pertain to a woman's use of her reproductive capabilities for
financial gain.
The UDHR proclaims that individuals have the right to choose
their work freely'63 but also to be free from slavery." As in the case
of the lower caste Indian woman with limited employment
opportunities and dire family needs, whether a surrogate is freely
choosing her work or whether her current circumstances render her
subject to involuntary servitude is a determination that can only be
made after consideration of factors beyond the reach of current
bioethics and human rights analysis. The UDBHR attempts to
account for such situations of undue inducement when it proclaims
that "[i]ndividuals and groups of special vulnerability should be
protected and the personal integrity of such individuals respected."165
But again there is no substantive discussion of what circumstances
make an individual or group vulnerable, or what "personal integrity"
means, so it is left open for individual countries to apply their own
social and cultural standards. The fatal flaw of the UDBHR is its
codification of the need to respect "the autonomy of persons to make
decisions" but failure to offer guidance for how to weigh human
rights obligations against autonomous choice, since, not
surprisingly, different countries have different takes on when
reproductive choice conflicts with human rights. In the United
Kingdom, for example, the influential 1984 Warnock Report argued
162. Id. arts. 3(1) and 3(2).
163. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, P 29, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 23(1)(2)(3) (the "right to work, to free choice of
employment, [and] to just and favourable conditions of work" and, relatedly, the
right to equal pay for equal work and "just and favourable remuneration ensuring for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity").
164. See Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, supra note 10,
arts. 4 and 7.
165. Id. art. 8.
166. Id. art. 5.
2012]1 283
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
that gestational surrogacy violated the human right to dignity because
"it is inconsistent with human dignity that a woman should use her
uterus for financial profit and treat it as an incubator for someone
else's child."' In the United States, however, officials have not made
such a pronouncement given its legal history of reproductive choice.
Ultimately, the UDBHR falls victim to the shortcomings of bioethical
analysis without reaping the intended benefit of adherence to human
rights concepts - the creation of a uniform global regulatory
framework that makes a political decision about an issue of social
justice.
VI. Biopolitics: A New Way of Thinking and Doing
In the United States, moral and ethical values are sometimes
considered private concerns and thus excluded from public debate
about matters on which government policy takes sides.'" This
explains the government's eagerness to utilize commissions of
bioethicists to make determinations about biotechnologies that will
have profound moral implications for all people.169 The
compartmentalization of debates to limited panels of experts
"discourages efforts to address the moral dimensions of public policy
and dampens public deliberations about shared values and the
common good."'o Such a system limits the ability of civil society
organizations to meaningfully advocate for their view of social justice
that has been informed by careful study and analysis of these
biotechnologies' impacts on communities. When joined with market
liberalism, the current political system "provides few conceptual
resources for resisting incursions of market dynamics into ever larger
areas of both public and private life."' Biopolitics is a new mode of
analysis that helps bring back "thicker" discussion and returns
Americans to their previous state of comfort with moral appeals, as
exemplified by Eleanor Roosevelt as Chair of the UDHR
167. See SPAR, supra note 7, at 83 (explaining that The Warnock Report refers to
the Report of the Committee of Enquiry Into Human Fertilisation and Embryology
presented to the British Office of Public Sector Information. The British government
subsequently prohibited commercial surrogacy under the 1985 Surrogacy
Arrangements Act, which made it illegal to broker a surrogacy arrangement, though
not necessarily to enter into one).
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Commission. 17 2
The goal of biopolitics is "to determine the appropriate
relationship between science and politics, and between science and
state.""' To this end, widespread consideration of social and ethical
values in the course of crafting policy is necessary.174 Like bioethics,
biopolitics has a set of core principles that create a common discourse
for its users, however, instead of emphasizing professionals' respect
for the patient's autonomy as Beauchamp and Childress do,
biopolitics practitioners would focus on "affirm[ing] the legitimacy
and the urgency of government oversight of human
biotechnologies."' Biopolitics inventor, Marcy Darnovsky, explains
that while private sector contributions to technological developments
are needed, market mechanisms are not a substitute for public policy,
and thus "technologies that can exacerbate social disparity must be
carefully regulated" with input from civil society and professional
organizations alike.' 6 The other four principles of biopolitics that
contribute to this goal are as follows: (1) recognition that because
science is inherently political, we need appropriate ways to utilize
political values in the creation of biotechnology policies; (2) inclusive
deliberation and decision-making when formulating policy on
biotechnologies; (3) thinking broadly about "known and potential
social consequences of biotechnologies and their applications - not
just their safety and efficacy"; and (4) exercising a healthy skepticism
of technological fixes for social problems."' As compared to the
traditional and the UDBHR versions of bioethics, biopolitics offers a
more complete analysis that better accomplishes the bioethics and
human rights goal of protecting vulnerable populations.
Despite the biotechnological triumphs of our time and the
globalization of markets and communication, the benefits of these
accomplishments are not available to millions of people who are
172. Id. at 110 ("Not so long ago, however, many American liberals and
progressives were comfortable with moral appeals. Eleanor Roosevelt, for example,
was Chair of the United Nations Commission that drafted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which asserts the legitimacy of 'meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.").
173. Darnovsky, Political Science, supra note 146, at 38.
174. Id. at 37.
175. Id. at 47.
176. Id. at 47-48.
177. Id. at 46-47.
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consequently being pushed further to the margins of society."' The
tools of biopolitics better address these problems of social justice and
public policy by introducing such social justice issues as countries'
histories of racism and classism into political discourse. For example,
in the United States, empirical studies show that employment
opportunity has historically been stratified by race and thus "it is not
irrational to think that black and Hispanic women would often agree
to be gestational surrogates for a lower fee than would white
women.""' Additionally, there exists the potential that a child born
to a gestational surrogate of a different race will be more likely to be
seen as a "product" because American society "tends to regard both
genetics and race as natural and essential components of personal
identity."1" In such cases of interracial gestational surrogacy, the
temptation to view the agreement to bear a child as a binding
employment contract will be particularly great, which may function to
the detriment of the surrogate's rights and respect for her humanity in
the arrangement." The new biopolitics analysis would bring to light
and analyze the impact of these historical regional and racial trends,
as well as the view that international adoptions contribute to the "so-
called development" of non-Western nations." Biopolitics'
substantive and procedural changes to the analysis of how
international surrogacy contracts should be regulated render it
capable of forming the basis of a more effective version of the
UDBHR by better informing and staffing the debate.
The ideal international regulation of surrogacy agreements
would be a substantive human rights proclamation from the United
Nations about a woman's right to use her reproductive capabilities for
economic gain. The democratic debate within and among member
nations that culminates in this change would need to be informed by
the principles of biopolitics in order to ensure that all points of view,
178. Salako, supra note 151, at 810.
179. MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT
MATrERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY,
ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 121 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Francisco J. Pilotti, Intercountry Adoption: A View from Latin America, 64
CHILD WELFARE 1, 27 (1985) (noting that the main child-importing countries have
historically been the United States, Canada, and many European countries, especially
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, and France. The main child-exporting
countries are in Latin America and Asia with "90 percent of the children adopted
from abroad" coming from these countries between 1975 and 1980).
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not just those that have gained universal acceptance, were considered.
A better-informed UN General Assembly would then be capable of
making a uniform global policy for the sake of global social justice.
VI. Conclusion
In our modern "global village," international transportation and
communication make it possible for citizens to practice procreative
tourism in order to exercise their personal reproductive choices in
other less restricted states.'83 This new market has the potential to
both benefit and exploit the women who act as surrogates and thus
far, individual nations' attempts to protect vulnerable populations
have both failed to incorporate diverse points of view and failed to
confront the cross-border aspect of surrogacy arrangements. The
complicated nature of the technology and economics at work in the
biotechnology and surrogacy markets have led to a general deferral to
professional bioethics analysis. The modern principles of bioethics,
however, are not well suited to creating policy. Principlism's
unjustified usurpation of the realm of biotechnical policy is further
exacerbated by the UDBHR, which attempts to blend bioethics
procedure with substantive human rights policy, but fails because of
its fatal contradiction between respect for diversity and a mandate for
social justice via uniform regulation.
The Nuremberg roots of the bioethics and human rights fields
demand active engagement in a social justice agenda that today must
be guided by the principles of biopolitics rather than the new,
procedural version of global bioethics. For biotechnologies that
affect fundamental elements of the human experience, civil society
groups that base their opinions on community impact data and give a
voice to the currently underrepresented must be involved in the
deliberation. This will help ensure that the international community
creates at a fully informed governing structure that prevents
international surrogacy from exacerbating and creating new forms of
social disparities and discrimination. Unfortunately, the UN may be
reluctant to do for surrogates what it did for human experiment
subjects until there is a similarly catastrophic call to value uniformity
of regulation over respect for cultural diversity as the atrocities that
led to the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg. This begs the question: do
we really want to wait for such a push?
183. Smerdon, supra note 2, at 27.
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